
WASHINGTON



CHORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In a memorandum to you on 16 August 1961, I recommended that the \$514.5 million for additional long-range bombers, the \$180 million additional for the B-70, and the \$85.8 million additional for Dynasoar, appropriated by the Congress for FI 1962 not be spent. Since that time, I have received and given careful consideration to the report of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee. I have also completed a review of U. S. requirements for long-range nuclear delivery symtems, and for military space research and development, as a part of a review of the Defense program for the period 1963-1967. I remain convinced that the additional appropriations should not be spent

Let me make clear that my reason for recommending against the procurement of an additional wing of long-range bombers is not a simple belief that bombers are becoming obsolete, either because ballistic missiles are, based on more advanced technology, or scause of prospective improvements in energy hir defenses. Indoed. as the Stennis Committee report pointed out, bombers can do things that missiles cannot do. As for enemy defenses, I we confident that the capability for defense suppression provided by the 1,000 air-launched missiles to be carried by alert 3-52's in my recommended program will be more than enough to enable the bombers to penetrate. My main reason for recommending against more bookers is that they are soft, concentrated, and vulnerable to ICM attack, wereas I se convinced that most of our long-range nuclear delivery forces must be either hard and dispersed or continuously mobile in peacetime, both in order to be protected from surprise missile attack and to have adequate survival potential in the warting environment. e plan to protect the bosbers by warning and alert response. Besides its "hair-trigger" aspects, this mechanism has other Italtations, even if successful. First, it leaves the non-elect half of the force unprotected. Second, it leaves us no alternative but to commit ecsentially all of the surviving bombers to atback n the first few hours of the war or to lose their capability as they run out of fuel and as their soft bases are destroyed. Moreover the bombers have to penetrate enemy defenses in large numbers after rolling back" the defenses with missiles. They cannot need in a selective and controlled way.

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For these reasons, I believe that we should concentrate our procurement funds for long-range nuclear delivery systems on hard and dispersed and mobile missiles.

This is not to say that we should not have a bomber force. Because of the special things bombers can do, we should have a mix. But we already have a large bomber force. In mid-1965, it will include 630 B-52's, 80 B-58's, and, if we do not decide to phase them out sooner, 225 B-47's. The alert B-52's and B-58's alone will be able to carry about 1,500 gravity bombs plus 1,000 air-launched missiles. The alert B-47's will be able to carry another 200 bombs. The B-52 and B-58 force will be able to be maintained substantially intact at least until 1970. These bombers can give us more than enough capability to perform the specialized tasks for which bombers are particularly well suited.

Furthermore, an examination of the target system shows that most targets, including all those of highest priority are best attacked by missiles, for several reasons. First, the existing targets are sort, fixed, and of known location, and therefore vulnerable to missile attack (though of ben well defended against bomber attack). Second, in the case of military targets, the missiles get there faster than so bombers and therefore would be more effective in catching enemy bumbers and missiles on the ground. Third, in the case of attacks on Soviet cities, is is clearly desirable to have the option to delay countries. It is clearly desirable to have the option to delay countries. Perhaps for many hours. For example, Polarie, which can be held in reserve for days if necessary, is much better than a bomber for this task.

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for the seek out and attack mobile targets. The Air Force is examining the use of the B-70 in a strike-reconnaissance role. However, even if it can be modified for this purpose, the changes in subsystems and doctrine would be so extensive that it does not appear reasonable to commit it to production at this time. Moreover, the problem of adequate pre-launch survival potential for bombers in the wartime environment has not been solved.

The B-70 funding request to the Congress totalled \$220.0 million. This is the required FI 1962 increment of a \$1.3 billion program extending through IT 1965 to provide and test three prototype aircraft, one of which will be equipped with a Bomb Mavigation System. Under this program, flight tests of the first aircraft will begin in December 1962, with the other two aircraft to follow at nine month intervals. The program permits the continuation of essential technological development and retains the option to proceed with the development of a complete weapon system at a later date, should it be determined to be mecessary. In view of the uncertainty, about the need for additional long-range bombers and the suitability of the B-70, I believe that the scope of the B-70 program as contained in the WY 1962 budget request adequately meets our desense needs. To spend the extra money in 1962 would be to restore the B-70 to the Air Force proposed full scale weapon system development program. The extra cost of the Air Force program over the cost of the program I am recommending would be not only the \$180 million in F7 1962, but also \$3 to \$5 billion over the pariod 1963-1967.

In the case of Dynasoar, we added \$10 million to expedite development in the first set of FY 1962 budget amendments. I know of no justification for obligating an additional 43.5 million in TI 1962, There is no known military requirement for Dynascary There is at most merely a possibility that senething of this cheracter may be required at some time in the future. Inder the circumstances, it seems to me to be best to descentitute on seaturing Lead time against the day thou spoke symbol at one of required The theat way to do this is to reoriems the project to solve the difficult technical problems involved in boosting a body of high lift into orbit Bustaining man in 15; and recovering the venicle at a designated place; There than to make or other than the second of the second Service of the servic to test mate appropriate und an equit series for the line of the line of But we about a boat of the state of the stat thet more momey for Dynason, while rear to the any strate and to he date of first successful margined flight.

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Your approval of the above recommendations is requested.

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