

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The President of the United States of America, Richard Nixon,
and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU,
L.I. Brezhnev,

Having thoroughly considered the question of the further
limitation of strategic arms, and the progress already achieved
in the current negotiations,

Reaffirming their conviction that the earliest adoption of
further limitations of strategic arms would be a major contribution
in reducing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war and in
strengthening international peace and security,

have agreed as follows:

First. The two Sides will continue active negotiations in order to work out a permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, as well as their subsequent reduction, proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972, [1] and from the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 26, 1972 on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. [2]

Over the course of the next year the two Sides will make serious efforts to work out the provisions of the permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms with the objective of signing it in 1974.

Second. New agreements on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments will be based on the principles of the American-Soviet documents adopted in Moscow in May 1972 and the agreements reached in Washington in June 1973; and in particular, both Sides will be guided by the recognition of each other's equal security interests and by the recognition that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage, directly or indirectly, would be inconsistent with the strengthening of peaceful relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Third. The limitations placed on strategic offensive weapons can apply both to their quantitative aspects as well as to their qualitative improvement.

¹ Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, p. 898.

² TIAS 7504; 23 UST 3462.

Fourth. Limitations on strategic offensive arms must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means.

Fifth. The modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms would be permitted under conditions which will be formulated in the agreements to be concluded.

Sixth. Pending the completion of a permanent agreement on more complete measures of strategic offensive arms limitation, both Sides are prepared to reach agreements on separate measures to supplement the existing Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972.

Seventh. Each Side will continue to take necessary organizational and technical measures for preventing accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under its control in accordance with the Agreement of September 30, 1971 between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. [1]

Washington, June 21, 1973


FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:



[1]

President of the United
States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:



[2]

General Secretary of the
Central Committee, CPSU

¹ TIAS 7186; 22 UST 1590

² Richard Nixon

³ L. I. Brezhnev