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AFTER
JUNE
1967

**NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION DOCUMENTS**

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Based upon the policy and technical results of these meetings, the Vice President requested the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA to prepare a funding plan with specific goals.

On May 8, 1961, the Vice President received a secret report from the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA entitled: "Recommendations for our National Space Program: Changes, Plans, Goals." "We recommend," the transmittal letter stated, "that if you concur with its contents and recommendations, it be transmitted to the President for his information and as a basis for early adoption and implementation of the revised and expanded objectives which it contains."⁴⁶

The document, some 30 pages in length, covering National Space Policy and Major National Space Goals, recommended FY 1962 add-ons of \$682 million.⁴⁷

Vice President Johnson found himself in agreement with its contents for, as he explained in his forwarding memorandum to the President, he had "conducted a series of hearings with responsible and informed representatives of the Executive, the Legislative, and the public" and "a major result of these consultations is the attached coordinated report

⁴⁶ Letter May 8, 1961, to Vice President Johnson from Webb and McNamara.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

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prepared by the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration." ⁴⁸

While he was "much impressed with the thoroughness and sense of urgency reflected in this document," the Vice President stated, "our evaluation and coordination will continue." ⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Memorandum for the President from the Vice President, May 8, 1961

⁴⁹ Ibid.

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International Cooperation

The Council became involved in developing proposals for cooperation in outer space with the USSR as early as October 24, 1961. On that date, in a letter to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Dr. Welsh pointed out:

"I have some reservations about urging the Soviets to put up communication satellites, as we want to be first with an operational system if at all possible. While I doubt that they would be interested in developing anything that might come close to a global system, they might want to put up a couple of satellites in order to show the world that they could do it first.

"Their closed or security-controlled system hampers efforts to attain cooperation between the U.S. and the USSR on space projects. However, a multi-part proposal might be worth consideration. Obviously, the most appropriate arena for international proposals on matters of space is the United Nations. On the other hand, all avenues which might lead to greater cooperation should be explored, even if they are initiated as bilateral agreements.

"A proposal on space could include the following:

- "1. Procedures for prompt exchange of scientific information obtained from space exploration;
- "2. Cooperative effort to activate a unit in the UN for receipt, codification, and dissemination of information as to space launches;
- "3. Joint participation in a global space weather system, through establishment and coordination of ground stations, etc., as well as through coordinated weather reporting;
- "4. Arrangements to foster cooperation in the allocation of frequencies, through the I. T. U., so that a communications satellite system can be usefully operable and grow to one giving maximum service world-wide;

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- "5. Improvement in the exchange of satellite tracking information;
- "6. Joint scientific exploration launches from our launching sites, in which each nation puts some scientific equipment in the payload;
- "7. Exchange of astronauts and cosmonauts for exposure to our respective biomedical testing facilities.⁸³

⁸³ Letter to Farley from Dr. Welsh, October 24, 1961.

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"The key issue," wrote Dr. Welsh, "which should be clarified for the Congress, the Executive Branch, and the general public is whether cooperative measures with the USSR will in any way inhibit the early acquisition by the United States of an independent manned lunar landing capability or compromise our national security. Therefore, the plan should envisage early public announcement that such U.S. capability will not be impaired or delayed by any cooperative measure which might be contemplated and that our national security interests will be fully protected.

"The background on recent negotiations with the Soviets might note Soviet willingness to negotiate legal issues on outer space along lines generally sought by the United States, as well as the Soviet agreement at the recently concluded I. T. U. meeting to allocate space communications which the United States considered the most technically desirable of the remaining available frequencies. The nuclear test ban negotiations and agreement offer an example of the rapid breakthrough in a position which had been repeatedly maintained for over half a decade. Planning therefore must proceed on the assumption that Soviet tactics and strategy are capable of a departure from long-held positions.

"The listing of low-risk confidence-building measures might also include some consideration of the feasibility of mutual allocation of payload space for small scientific 'piggy-back' experiments to explore the lunar environment. Additionally, a search for measures of cooperation might include standardization of astronaut rescue capability, including docking attachments, capsule atmosphere, and emergency communication frequencies. Consideration might also be given to a space program personnel exchange program as part of our ongoing scientific and technical exchange program.

"The desirability of placing any U.S. -Soviet bilateral lunar efforts in the context of a broader international effort might also be examined. This might be accomplished by setting as a long-range goal the establishment of meaningful cooperation in the realm of interplanetary missions. This has the merit of being near enough in time to be reasonable and yet sufficiently demanding in scope so that plans are not yet fully developed by either side.

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"Additionally it might be useful to draw a distinction between cooperative measures aimed at delaying technological advance (e. g. arms control) and cooperation aimed at furthering technological advance (e. g. space developments).

"The step-by-step confidence-building approach which you have so ably outlined in the latter portion should of course be retained in any succeeding versions.

"We will be interested in following this paper during the next phase of its development, and members of my staff will be available to further explore with you the merit of any specific suggestions."

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The National Security Council established a subcommittee on communications on October 26, 1962.¹⁴⁷

On January 23, 1963, a Special Subcommittee on Communications Satellites to the NSC (NSAM 201) subcommittee was established:

1. To keep abreast of and report to the NSC subcommittee on current plans and developments regarding communications satellite systems.
2. To study and report on the potential impact of communications satellite programs on the NSC and NSC requirements which should be taken into account in the development of communications satellites. The Council was invited to designate a representative. Mr. R. W. Hale was designated to represent the Council staff.¹⁴⁸

A report was issued by this Special Subcommittee on Communications Satellites which concluded that:

1. Communications satellites will have a significant impact on the NSC, probably starting in 1966.
2. The prospects of communications satellites are sufficiently promising to warrant de-emphasizing terrestrial systems.
3. Availability of adequate funds was critical to fulfillment of communication satellite promises.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ NSAM No. 201 (Confidential)

¹⁴⁸ NSC memorandum to Dr. Welsh, January 28, 1963. Memorandum to P. H. Burris from Dr. Welsh, January 30, 1963. (Confidential)

¹⁴⁹ Memorandum to R. W. Hale from NSC (P. H. Burris), April 10, 1963- (Confidential)

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On June 5, 1963, the President established an ad hoc committee on communications satellite problems which included Dr. Welsh as a member. 150

This committee was to guide and coordinate the government's action in bringing into reality the intent of the ComSat Act of 1962, both in terms of creating a corporate entity and establishing the organizational framework for the international global communications system.

Dr. Welsh argued that the U. S. have a separate military communications satellite system; that ComSat Corporation, as a private U. S. corporation, cooperate with other nations in the communications field; that ComSat Corporation should proceed as soon as possible to obtain equity funds; and that NASA and DOD continue R&D in the communications field. 151

The policy question of reimbursement of the government for launch costs incurred when launching commercial communications satellites was resolved in a meeting attended by representatives from NASA, Justice, and the Council. 152

150 Memorandum to Mr. Katzenbach from Mr. R. A. Dungan (White House), June 5, 1963. Memorandum to Dr. Welsh from R. L. Clark (OEP), June 10, 1963.

151 Position paper distributed at June 15, 1963, meeting of ad hoc committee on Communication Satellite Problems. Memorandum to R. L. Clark from Dr. Welsh, July 30, 1963.

152 Memorandum for the President from Dr. Welsh, December 24, 1963.

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On January 20, 1964, Dr. Welsh recommended to Mr. Katzenbach, as chairman of the ad hoc committee on communications problems, that the President be briefed on the ComSat Corporation picture. At the January 30, 1964, meeting of the ad hoc committee, Mr. Katzenbach advised that he would prepare a memorandum to the President on the progress made in the communications satellite area. ¹⁵³ ¹⁵⁴

NSAM 338

On January 12, 1965, the Director of OTM requested Dr. Welsh to participate in developing an over-all policy concerning allowable assistance and encouragement to other nations which may lead to their development and acquisition of independent satellite communications capabilities. ¹⁵⁵

Various meetings and discussions ensued; memoranda were exchanged. On February 26, 1965, the Special Assistant to the President on Telecommunications submitted a statement of policy to Dr. Welsh for consideration. ¹⁵⁶

¹⁵³ Memorandum to Mr. Katzenbach from Dr. Welsh, January 30, 1964.

¹⁵⁴ Memorandum to Dr. Welsh from Mr. Mrozinski, February 3, 1964.

¹⁵⁵ Memorandum to Dr. Welsh from J. D. O'Connell, January 12, 1965.

¹⁵⁶ Memorandum to Dr. Welsh from O'Connell, February 26, 1965.

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Comments were made by memorandum on March 1, 1965.¹⁵⁷ On May 12, 1965, a revised copy of a policy statement was submitted to Dr. Welsh.¹⁵⁸ Non-enthusiastic concurrence was provided on May 17, 1965.¹⁵⁹ The final policy statement was promulgated on September 15, 1965, as NSAM 338.¹⁶⁰

As a follow-on to the ad hoc intra-government committee (Katzenbach committee) on communication policy matters, the Director of Telecommunications Management proposed the formation of a new Communications Satellite Policy Coordination Committee, to consist of representatives at the Presidential Appointee level. The Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council was asked to participate as a member.¹⁶¹

Dr. Welsh accepted and designated two staff members to serve on ad hoc panels as necessary.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁷ Memorandum to O'Connell from Dr. Welsh, March 1, 1965.

¹⁵⁸ Memorandum to Dr. Welsh from O'Connell, May 12, 1965.

¹⁵⁹ Memorandum to O'Connell from Dr. Welsh, May 17, 1965.

¹⁶⁰ Memorandum to various (NSAM 338) from McGeorge Bundy, September 15, 1965.

¹⁶¹ Letter to Dr. Welsh from DTM, February 21, 1966.

¹⁶² Memorandum to DTM from Dr. Welsh, February 23, 1966.

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A U. S. National Program Policy Panel and a Communications Satellite Technology Panel were organized as part of the new Policy Coordination Committee.¹⁶³

In the Policy Coordination Committee meeting on March 23, 1966, one of the major tasks identified was to review and revise as necessary the policy concerning U. S. assistance in the development of foreign communications satellite capabilities, NSAM 338.¹⁶⁴ The Council staff provided extensive support towards bringing this policy statement up to date.¹⁶⁵

On October 31, 1966, the Executive Secretary of the Council advised DTM that the Vice President would like a status report at the next Council meeting of the NSAM 338 revision.¹⁶⁶ Such a report was made to the Council on November 7, 1966.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ Memorandum to Members from DTM, March 24, 1966.

¹⁶⁴ NSAM 338, September 15, 1965 (Confidential). National Aeronautics and Space Council meeting, March 23, 1966 (Confidential).

¹⁶⁵ Memorandum to Dr. Welsh from Mr. Mrozinski, October 4, 1966.
Memorandum to O'Connell from Dr. Welsh, October 5, 1966.

¹⁶⁶ Memorandum to DTM from Dr. Welsh, October 31, 1966.

¹⁶⁷ Memorandum to DTM from Dr. Welsh, November 7, 1966.

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Work continued on the revision of NSAM 338. Drafts were commented on, and new drafts were composed and offered.¹⁶⁸

On June 28, 1967, OTM submitted a proposed revision of NSAM 338 to the White House. This was noted and concurred in by the President on July 12, 1967.¹⁶⁹

On November 29, 1965, the President established a Working Group under Chairmanship of Leonard Marks, Director of USIA, to determine whether national policy would be served by encouraging the construction of ground stations for the global satellite system for LDC's. Dr. Welsh was designated a member of this group, which finished its work and submitted its report to the President on January 28, 1966.¹⁷⁰

On March 4, 1966, the policy recommended by the Working Group was approved and promulgated as NSAM 342.¹⁷¹

Another policy action placed before the Communications Satellite Policy Coordination Committee involved the government's role as an "authorized

¹⁶⁸ Memoranda to OTM from Dr. Welsh, November 22, 1966, and January 13, 1967. Memorandum to W. E. Berg from Dr. Welsh, May 13, 1967. Memorandum to OTM from W. E. Berg, May 17, 1967.

¹⁶⁹ Memorandum to Walt W. Rostow from OTM, June 28, 1967. NSAM 338 (Revised), July 12, 1967.

¹⁷⁰ Memorandum to the President from Leonard Marks, January 31, 1966.

¹⁷¹ NSAM 342, March 4, 1966 (Confidential).

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